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Abstract 
This paper specifies a nd e stimates a p roduction f unction f or t he a irline industry, 
identifying firms' network characteristics and efficiency as the main determinants of their 
productivity. The application of this analysis to the European market shows that productivi-
ty differences among flag c arriers c ould explain the g overrnnents' different v iews about 
deregulation at the beginning of the eighties. The introduction of liberal bilateral agreements 
by some European goverrnnents has given their flag carriers incentives to start adjusting 
their structure in anticipation of future liberalization in the European market while other 
European flag carriers have delayed this adjustment. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the main determinants of productivity in the airline 
industry, identifying network attributes which lie outside the firms' control, as well 
as firms' technical and allocative inefficiency. The application of this analysis to 
the European market allows me to identify airlines' productivity differences at the 
beginning of the eighties which could have affected the view of the European 
govermnents about the timing for introducing deregulatory policies. Additionally, 
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this study aims to evaluate the effects of the alternative policies introduced by the 
European governments during the eighties. 
At the beginning of the eighties, some European countries such as the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Germany signed liberal bilateral 
agreements with the U.S. allowing for free entry, and price and capacity 
competition on their North-Atlantic routes. Subsequently, between 1984 and 1986 
the same countries introduced liberal bilateral agreements between them. During 
the second half of the eighties, flag carriers from these countries had to face strong 
competition both in the North Atlantic routes and in many intra-European 
international routes. On the other hand, other European countries, such as 
Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain followed a more protective policy, 
keeping their bilateral agreements highly regulated, and restricting both entry and 
competition. 
Additionally, during the same period the European Commission provided 
several reports recommending the gradual deregulation of the industry (e.g. 
European Economic Commission, 1984). As a result, the European Council 
approved a first package of deregulatory measures in 1987 allowing for limited 
competition in prices and capacities and restricted entry, and so fixing an upper 
bound for airline regulation within the European Community. These measures 
were extended in 1990 and 1993. The package of measures introduced in 1993 
allows for free entry and price and capacity competition within the European 
Union. 
Therefore, during the second half of the eighties, it is possible to distinguish 
between two different sets of European countries: those that have liberalised their 
bilateral agreements with the U.S. and other European countries, and those that 
keep restrictive agreements with the U.S. and apply the EC legislation to the 
European international routes.1 This paper tries to umavel the economic reasons 
behind these two alternative policies and to measure their effects on firms' 
productivity. 
I specify a stochastic production function for the airline industry in which 
exogenous firms' characteristics are allowed to affect output-factor elasticities, 
total factor productivity and input combinations 2 in order to analyze a panel of 
data for the period 1980-89 that includes European carriers from ten different 
countries and nine American airlines. Given that domestic and international 
regulatory agreements limit the freedom of companies to decide the set of routes 
that they want to supply, the final output can be regarded as exogenous while the 
1 Marin (1995) analyses the effects of these two alternative regimes on pricing policy and market 
structure. 
2 Several authors (see Schmidt and Sickles, 1984, Sickles, 1985 and Cornwell et al., 1990, among 
others) have measured firms' inefficiency taking into account the effect of exogenous characteristics on 
total factor productivity but not on output-factor elasticities and input combinations. 
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inputs are endogenous. Accordingly, I follow the estimation procedure suggested 
by Kumbhakar (1987) and estimate the first order conditions for the input 
combinations to obtain a measure of allocative inefficiency. Provided with these 
estimates I transform and estimate the production function. To test for the 
robustness of the results, I consider two alternative approaches to measure 
technical inefficiency for each firm. 
I find that network characteristics affect both total factor productivity and input 
combinations. I also identify the main differences in efficiency and network 
characteristics among European flag carriers at the beginning of the eighties and 
their effect on productivity. I find that these productivity differences could 
underlay the differences in regulatory policy followed by the European govern-
ments. 
I also find that the introduction of liberalization has given rise to a short run 
reduction in efficiency that is expected to be followed by long run efficiency 
improvements. There are two complementary reasons for this short run effect. 
First, firms may decide to use more productive inputs which require some time 
before being efficiently utilized. Second, airlines face both the strong opposition 
from professional associations to reductions in their labour force, and imperfec-
tions in the second-hand market for aircraft. This means that the reorganization of 
their output cannot be immediately followed by adjustments in their input 
requirements. Accordingly, it seems that companies from countries that introduced 
liberal bilateral agreements during the eighties had a strong incentive to start 
implementing adjustment plans and they are expected to start improving their 
efficiency during the nineties. Airlines from countries with more protective 
regulatory policies seem to have started implementing adjustment plans only 
recently after the approval of the third EC package of deregulatory measures in 
1993. This would lead to a strong asymmetry between these two sets of companies 
that could be crucial in determining the future market configuration for the 
European airline industry. 
2. Model and econometric approach 
2.1. On the estimation of production functions. 
A production function determines the maximum possible output which can be 
produced from given quantities of a set of inputs, i.e., a limit or frontier to the 
range of possible observations, such that we can observe points below the 
production frontier but not above. Accordingly, the amount by which a firm lies 
below its production frontier can be regarded as a measure of inefficiency. We can 
distinguish two types of efficiency. Following Forsund et al. (1980), let us suppose 
that a firm has a production plan (Y 0 , X 0 ) where the first argument represents the 
set of outputs and the second the set of inputs. Given production functionf(.), the 
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plan is technically efficient if Y 0 = f(X0 ) and technically inefficient if Y 0 <f(X0 ). 
So, one possible measure of technical efficiency is provided by the ratio 0 ~ Y 0 I 
f(X0 ) ~ 1. Additionally, assuming f to be differentiable, the plan is allocatively 
efficient if f;(X0 )!.f}X0 ) = w Jwl' where J; and wJ are the marginal product and the 
price of input ~, correspondingly. Therefore, allocative efficiency implies that 
inputs are combined in the right proportion given their prices.3 
The empirical literature on the estimation of production frontiers has as its first 
benchmark the seminal paper of Farrell (1957) who provided a nonparametric 
framework for the measurement of both technical and allocative inefficiency based 
on linear programming techniques. Farrell also proposed a parametric approach 
that was followed by Aigner and Chu (1968), who specified a production function 
such as 
Y = f(X) exp(-u), (1) 
where the deterministic frontier is f(x) and u is an error term greater or equal than 
zero that captures the effect of inefficiency relative to the frontier. Note that u?: 0 
implies that all the observations lie on or beneath the frontier. The parameters can 
be "estimated" either by linear or quadratic programming. In this case, the 
problem is that the "estimators" have no statistical properties. However, the 
deterministic parametric frontier can be translated into a deterministic statistical 
frontier by making some assumption about X and u.4 
A second and more relevant problem arises from more philosophical considera-
tions. The method of estimating a deterministic frontier assumes that all the firms 
in the sample share a production frontier and any variation in a firm's performance 
is attributed to a variation in the firm's efficiency relative to the common family 
frontier. This assumption can be accepted in a theoretical model but is difficult to 
justify in an empirical analysis. A firm's performance is affected by some factors 
outside its control (e.g., weather) and some which are under its control (inef-
ficiency). This situation gets reinforced in presence of some statistical noise due 
either to measurement error on the dependent variable or to omitted variables 
which are individually unimportant.5 
A stochastic production function model may be written as 
Y = f(X) exp(E), (2) 
3 See Forsund et al. (1980) for a more general survey regarding production, cost and profit functions. 
4 Note, however, that the range of the dependent variables depends on the parameters to be estimated 
which violates one of the regularity conditions necessary to prove the maximum likelihood properties 
of consistency and asymptotic efficiency. Several authors (see Greene, 1980, and Richmond, 1974, 
among others) reconsider this problem and provide solutions. 
5 See Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 
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where Eis an error term defined as E=(v-u), and v and u are two components 
independent of each other and defined as follows: v is a symmetric component that 
measures random variations of the frontier across firms and captures the effects of 
measurement error, other statistical "noise" and random shocks outside the firm's 
control, and u is a one-sided component greater or equal than zero that captures 
the effect of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. Therefore, the 
stochastic frontier is f(X)exp(v), and exp(-u) = Y lf(X)exp(v) measures technical 
efficiency relative to the stochastic production frontier. Provided u?: 0, all the 
obseIVations lie on or beneath the stochastic production frontier. The population 
average technical inefficiency can be easily calculated and the entire E is easily 
estimated for each obseIVation, but the problem is to separate it into its two 
components, v and u. 
Jondrow et al. (1982) suggest a solution to this problem by considering the 
expected value of u conditional on E, i.e. E(u;k). A shortcoming ofthis method is 
that the researcher must specify the distribution taken by u. This problem is 
mitigated because he can estimate the variance of u and v. If he has assumed a 
wrong distribution for u, most of the variation will be picked up by the symmetric 
component v. When the researcher obseIVes this, an alternative distribution should 
be tried. In particular, Jondrow et al. provide examples when the inefficiency error 
term, u, is assumed to follow the half-normal and the one-sided exponential 
distributions. Another shortcoming of this approach is that it is designed for 
cross-section data and cannot be applied to a panel of data. However, Battese and 
Coelli (1988), provide a solution that conditions the value of u on all the 
information available in the panel and then they estimate E(u;ki , ... ,E;r ). 
Additionally, the availability of panel data allows for an alternative solution. 
Schmidt and Sickles ( 1984) consider this case and allow for a different intercept 
for each firm, interpreting the intercepts as a measure of inefficiency. This 
approach also has several shortcomings. First, it cannot measure u; independently 
of the intercept, but imposes a normalization based on the most efficient firm. 
Second, the introduction of firm fixed effects is equivalent to a transformation of 
the model in which variables are redefined in terms of differences from each firm's 
time average value. This implies that all the variables that are time invariant are 
dropped from the regression, and their effect is included to some extent in the firm 
fixed effect. If the set of time invariant variables includes relevant and significant 
variables, the fixed effect will not measure inefficiency but will rather measure the 
effect of variables exogenous to the firm. In the same paper, Schmidt and Sickles 
consider some of these problems and propose alternative methods such as GLS 
and the Hausman-Taylor estimation procedure. 
One further shortcoming of the previous models is pointed out by Kumbhakar 
(1987, 1990) who argues that these estimation procedures may result in inconsis-
tent estimates when the inputs are endogenous. A possible solution to this problem 
is to follow a cost function approach that assumes that the firms minimise the cost 
of producing a certain quantity of output, given the input prices. 
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Kumbhakar proposes an alternative procedure which follows the production 
function approach. In particular, he proposes a two-step estimation procedure. The 
first step involves the simultaneous estimation of the first order conditions for the 
input combinations, taking as given the level of output and the input prices. The 
results of this estimation provide a measure of the allocative inefficiency. 
Substituting the estimates from these equations into the production function, we 
can obtain a combination of the input requirements that can be expressed as a 
function of the exogenous level of output. In a second step, the estimation of the 
transformed production function provides a measure of technical inefficiency. The 
main advantage of this method with respect to the cost function approach is that it 
provides a separate measure of allocative and technical inefficiency. 
Given that domestic and international regulatory agreements limit the freedom 
of airlines to decide the set of routes that they want to supply, their final output can 
be regarded as an exogenous variable while their inputs are endogenous. For this 
reason, the approach developed by Kumbhakar seems to be quite suitable for the 
estimation of the production function for the airline industry. In particular, I apply 
this approach and I use both, Battese and Coelli, 1988 correction on Jondrow et al. 
(1982) method based on the E(u;ki , ... ,E;r) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) fixed 
effects approach. 
2.2. Network attributes and their effect on productivity. 
Kumbhakar's method assumes an homogeneous output but this is not the case 
for the airline industry where each firm combines a set of outputs (routes) in 
different proportions. Accordingly, the efficiency of firms that supply different 
combinations of various outputs cannot be measured unless we include in the 
production function a set of control variables, C, that proxy the main characteris-
tics of the firms' final output mix. It is possible to think about several variables to 
proxy the characteristics of the firms' network, the most important being the 
average routes' length or Average Stage Length (ASL), and the concentration of 
their operations, proxied by the Airport Concentration (AC).6 These two variables 
measure the distribution of the products supplied as well as the proximity or 
relatedness among them and are expected to affect not only the total factor 
productivity, but also the output-factor elasticities and the input combinations. 
6 The American literature provides many examples that show the effects of these two variables on 
firms' costs and profits. For instance, Caves et al. (1984) conclude that distance has relevant effects on 
cost economies, and Evans and Kessides (1993) note the many effects of airport concentration on 
firms' conduct and performance. 
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2.3. Production function for the airline industry. 
Let us assume a specific form for the airlines' production functionf(.) including 
all the characteristics mentioned above. For instance, we can assume a Cobb-
Douglas technology for each firm i and period t, such as 
(3) 
where Y is the output, A is a constant term, K, L and E represent the capital, labour 
and fuel inputs, respectively, h/ C), for j = K, L, E, are functions of the control 
variables, C, which proxy network attributes, t is a trend dummy variable that 
measures general technical change, f3 and g are coefficients, and E = (v - u) is the 
error term as defined above. 
It is important to note that in previous studies 7 the control variables were 
assumed to affect only the total factor productivity and therefore were included in 
the production function as a multiplicative term. However, the implicit assumption 
that exogenous control variables affect all the inputs in the same proportion has 
neither theoretical nor empirical justification. For this reason, the specification 
proposed here includes a different function of the control variables, h/C), entering 
the exponent of each input. This implies that the control variables are allowed to 
affect the output-factor elasticities and, subsequently, the input combinations and 
the returns to scale. 
From the first order conditions for a profit maximizing firm, it is easy to obtain 
the expressions for the optimal input combinations, which are 
f31hK(C;,) KitpKitlY;, 
(4) 
f33hE(Cit) EitpEitlY;,' 
f32hL(C;,) Litwit!Y;, 
(5) 
f33hE(C;,) EitpEitlY;,' 
where PK, w and PE are the prices of capital, labour and fuel, respectively, and 
h/Cit) can be specified as 
(6) 
Rewriting the right hand side of Eqs. ( 4) and ( 5) as the cost share ratio between 
capital and fuel, (SK/SE)w and labour and fuel, (SL/SE)w correspondingly, taking 
logs and substituting for (6), we can rewrite (4) and (5) as follows 
7 See Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Sickles (1985) and Cornwell et al. (1990), among others. 
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ln(SK/SE)it = ln(/31 //33) + (81K - BIE) lnASLi, + (82K - 82E) lnACi, + T/cK,E)w 
(7) 
ln(SL/SE)it = ln(f32/f33) + (81L - BIE) lnASLi, + (82L - 82E) lnACi, + T/cL,E)it· 
(8) 
Following Kumbhakar (1987, 1990), I assume that vw TJcK,EJ and TJcL,EJ are 
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and finite variance, and 
T/cK,EJ and T/cL,EJ are uncorrelated with ui.
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Additionally, I allow the cov(TJcK,El' 
T/cL,EJ) to be different from zero, which implies that Eqs. (7) and (8) must be 
estimated simultaneously by a two-step GLS estimation procedure. Finally, I 
assume error terms of the form T/it =cit+ ei + µ,, i.e. there are firm and time 
specific random components. I recover the firm specific effects, which measure 
allocative inefficiency, as ei = 2:,,TJitlT. The estimation of these two equations also 
produces efficient estimates of (/31 I /33), (81K - BIE), (82K - 82E), (/32 / f33), (81L -
()IE), and (()2L - ()2E). 
Finally, to estimate Eq. (3) we define 
b 
zit= f ASL;;1K-drnlAc;;2K-a2El lnKi, + 
3 
(9) 
where bi and diJ are the estimates of /3i and Bil' respectively.9 Taking logs in (3), 
substituting (6) and (9) and solving for zw we obtain the following expression 
zit== 
- ll' - gt + ln Yit - Eit 
f33ASL~,rn AC~,2E (10) 
where a= ln A and E = (v -u) as before, where v follows a normal distribution and 
u, which measures technical efficiency is assumed to be positive. We can estimate 
this equation by Non Linear Least Squares, assuming that K, L and E are 
endogenous, while Y and the input prices are exogenous. Then I assume that u is 
distributed as half-exponential and apply Jondrow et al. (1982) approach with the 
correction introduced by Battese and Coelli (1988) for panel data, to obtain 
8 According to Schmidt and Lovell, 1980 "u and 7/ might be expected to be correlated over a long 
period of time but the relationship between them in any given year is unpredictable as firms follow long 
term dynamic investment programs and can adjust slowly to changes in market conditions and prices. 
This means that while we may expect a positive correlation between technical and allocative 
inefficiency in a dynamic sense, it is not clear that we should expect such a relationship between our 
static measures of technical and allocative inefficiency". 
9 Note that this approach also avoids likely collinearity problems among the inputs. 
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E(u;k1, ... ,E;r), i.e., the individual estimates for technical inefficiency. I also apply 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) fixed effects method to obtain firm specific intercepts, 
a;= a - u i' that measure technical inefficiency. The estimates provided by these 
two alternative procedures can be compared to test the robustness of the results. 
3. Empirical results. 
3.1. Data and variables. 
The sample contains 10 European companies and 9 American carriers for which 
there were available data. The European firms can be split in two different 
categories: flag carriers from the countries that introduced liberal bilateral 
agreements, LBA Flag Carriers, which are AerLingus-Aerlinte, British Airways, 
KLM, Lufthansa and Sabena, and flag carriers from other European countries, 
regarded as a control group, Control-Europe, specifically, Air France, Alitalia, 
Iberia, SAS and Tap AP. Finally, the American carriers constitute a second control 
group, Control-USA, that includes American, Continental, Delta, Eastern, North-
west, Pan Am, TWA, United and USAir. 
All the data have been taken from the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion-Digest of Statistics for the period 1980-1989. The measure of output is 
transferred space, in particular, firm's available seats-Km.10 To measure labour 
inputs, six categories of personnel have been used to construct an index that gives 
weights to different categories according to their relative real wages. Capital input 
is measured by the total capacity installed, i.e., the total number of seats available 
in the firm's fleet. Fuel is measured by the total firm consumption of aircraft fuel 
and oil. Airport Concentration is defined as one over the firm's cost share devoted 
to airport services and utilities,11 and Average Stage Length as the average length 
of the routes served by each airline weighted by the number of flights on each 
1°Following Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Sickles (1985), among others, I assume that any 
unfilled space is wastage. 
11 Flying any given route implies the cost of airport services plus flying costs (that can be treated as 
unit costs). Assuming that all routes have the same length (which is sensible as we control for changes 
in ASL) and given that the price that firms pay for flying from a given airport has a large fixed 
component, when a firm is flying each new route from two new airports not shared with any other 
route, the cost share devoted to airport services remains constant at its maximum, say M (minimum 
airport concentration). When several routes are concentrated around a reduced number of airports, total 
costs grow faster than airport services costs and the cost share devoted to airport services is smaller 
thanM. For any given number of routes, the cost share devoted to airport services will have a minimum 
that can be reached for a given combination of airports (situation of maximum airport concentration). 
Accordingly I use the inverse of the cost share devoted to airport services as a proxy for airport 
concentration. The minimum concentration level attainable would imply a value for this variable of 
1 IM, while higher concentration levels would imply values above 1 IM. 
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route. The cost shares of capital, labour and energy are proxied by the actual firms' 
operating expenses devoted to rental of flight equipment and normal depreciation 
of flight equipment and ground property and equipment, flight crew salaries and 
expenses, and aircraft fuel and oil, over total expenses. The data on labour and 
energy inputs is not disaggregated for passengers, cargo and mail, so I correct 
these variables by the share of revenues derived from passenger services. Finally, 
t, the trend variable, is equal to one in 1980 and incremented by one each year. 
3.2. Estimates for the input combinations and the production function. 
Table 1 shows the results of estimating the first order conditions for the optimal 
input combinations represented by Eqs. (7) and (8). These two equations have 
been simultaneously estimated by a two-step GLS estimator within a two-way 
Random Effects Model (REM) that assumes an error term of the form T/it = (it+ 
e; + µ,, with firm and time specific components, and allowing for the cov( T/cK,E)w 
T/cL,EJ;,) to be different from zero. The purpose of these two regressions is to 
measure allocative inefficiency, to obtain estimates for (/31 I {33 ) and ({32 / {33 ) and to 
observe whether the control variables, Average Stage Length (ASL) and Airport 
Concentration (AC), affect the input combinations. The results are the following. 
First, the coefficient of ln ASL is not significant in the labour-fuel combination 
equation and is only significant at the 11 % level in the capital-fuel combination 
equation. This suggests that airlines operating on longer routes have higher 
requirements of capital per unit of both fuel and labour, i.e., on average they are 
Table 1 
Input combination equations. Estimation method: Two-step GLS within a two-way Random Effects 
Model 
Independent Dependent variables 
variables In (SK I SE),, In (SL I SE),, 
Constant -5.40 -2.96 
(-2.81) (-1.52) 
In ASL,, 0.36 0.06 
(1.56) (0.28) 
In AC,, -0.70 -0.54 
(-2.78) (-2.18) 
var(e,1) 0.08 0.08 
var(u,) 0.04 0.06 
var(µ,) 0.03 0.01 
cov( 7/,t(K,E)• 7/,t(L,E)) 0.05 0.05 
Number of observations 190 190 
Notes: 
t-test in parenthesis. 
Both equations have been estimated by two-step GLS with error terms of the form 7/,, = (,, +e, + µ1, i.e., 
with firm and time specific random components, and allowing for cov(71,1(K,EJ• 71,,(L,EJ)""O 
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operating larger aircraft.12 Second, the coefficient of ln AC is negative and 
significant in both equations. This means that a larger airport concentration 
reduces the demand for both capital and labour per unit of fuel, and so per flight, 
given that we are including the variable ASL in the regression.13 The better capital 
and labour utilization ratios are justified by the greater possibility for sharing these 
two inputs among different routes when they have more common endpoints. 
Provided with this information, we can construct z as defined in (9) and estimate 
the transformed production function expressed in Eq. (10) by Non Linear Least 
Squares. The error term has been decomposed into two terms, v which follows a 
normal distribution and u which measures technical inefficiency and is assumed to 
be positive. First, I apply Jondrow et al. (1982) approach with the correction 
introduced by Battese and Coelli (1988) for panel data. I assume that u is 
distributed as half exponential withf(u)=@e-eu and obtain E(u;k1, ... ,E;r), i.e., 
the individual estimates for technical inefficiency. Second, I apply Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) fixed effects method, allowing for a different intercept for each firm 
which measures technical inefficiency. The results of applying these two alter-
native approaches are reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2, respectively. 
The results are very robust to changes in the estimation procedure. 
The coefficient g represents the annual rate at which the production function 
shifts as a result of factors not explicitly included in the regression, such as general 
technical change. The estimate of g is not significant at any level. This suggests 
that during this period there has not been any significant shift in the production 
function owing to general technical change. The estimated coefficients for ASL 
and AC are very significant which means that these two variables affect the 
elasticity of fuel inputs. Also, the R 2 and the F-test that measure the goodness of 
the fit are very satisfactory. 
Table 3 presents the structural form parameters which are recovered from the 
estimates given in Table 1 and column (1) in Table 2. When provided with these 
estimates, we can easily construct the average output-factor elasticities for the 
three inputs: capital, labour and fuel. These are 0.20, 0.14 and 0.63, respectively. 
We also find that a large Average Stage Length increases the elasticity of capital 
and reduces the elasticity of labour and fuel. This means that when ASL increases, 
the productivity of one extra unit of capital increases as well while the productivity 
of one extra unit of either labour or fuel falls. In tum, this result suggests that after 
an exogenous increase in ASL, firms intensify the use of their crew and fuel (e.g. 
using larger aircraft) substituting these two inputs by capital. For a given traffic 
density, high frequencies imply smaller aircrafts with larger crews per seat 
12 ln fact the correlation between ASL and average plane size is 0.78 for the data in the sample. 
13 The ASL determines the number of flights to produce a certain output. By including ASL in the 
regression, we take into account the impact of a different number of departures on the input 
combinations. 
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Table 2 
Stochastic production frontier. Estimation method: Non-Linear Least Squares. Function to estimate: 
a 
g 
/33 
Rz 
F 
- a - gt + In Y,, - E,1 
{33AsL:ilEAc:i2E 
(d.f.) 
Std.Dev.(u) 
Std.Dev.(v) 
Number of observations 
Notes: 
t-test in parenthesis. 
(1) 
8.47 
(90.01) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
2.78 
(23.11) 
-0.08 
(-20.00) 
0.33 
( 47. 78) 
0.99 
3431.65 
( 4, 186) 
0.17 
0.11 
190 
(2) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
2.43 
(24.16) 
-0.07 
(-20.77) 
0.32 
(53.46) 
0.99 
2188.84 
(9, 180) 
0.09 
0.10 
190 
In column (1 ), the error term E has been decomposed in two terms, v,1, which follows a normal 
distribution, and u, distributed as half exponential with f(u) = @e - 19", and technical inefficiency has 
been calculated as E(u,lc," ... ,Ea) according to Battese and Coelli (1988). In column (2), the terms u, 
have been added to the intercept, allowing for a different intercept for each firm and interpreting the 
intercepts as measures of technical inefficiency. 
available and more take-offs and landings which imply a higher consumption of 
fuel per seat-Km. High frequencies also reduce the cost associated to waiting time 
for the passengers. As the length of the trip becomes shorter, the cost associated 
with waiting increases as a fraction of the total time cost of the trip. This means 
that the longer the length of the trip the lower the relative cost associated with 
waiting time and the lower the marginal productivity of inputs necessary to 
Table 3 
Stochastic production frontier. Estimates for the structural form parameters 
/3, 0.01 O!L -0.08 
/32 0.14 OzL -0.21 
/33 2.78 81E -0.08 
B,K 0.28 82E 0.33 
OzK -0.37 
Note: 
Structural form parameters derived from results in Table 1 and regression ( 1) in Table 2. 
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increase frequencies. For the same reasons price becomes more relevant as a 
fraction of total costs (price plus time costs) faced by consumers and the marginal 
productivity of price reducing inputs increases. Accordingly, firms choose a larger 
average plane size for longer trips at the expense of having lower frequencies. 
Additionally, a larger Airport Concentration reduces the output-factor elasticity 
of capital and labour, and increases the elasticity of fuel. This suggests that airlines 
can easily share capital and labour inputs among different routes when they share 
more common endpoints and an extra unit of either capital or labour has a smaller 
effect on output. Therefore, when aiiport concentration increases, the productivity 
of one extra unit of either labour or capital falls. On the other hand, the elasticity 
of fuel increases with airport concentration. This means that after an exogenous 
increase in AC, firms intensify the use of their fleet and crew (e.g., using smaller 
aircraft, increasing their frequencies, using the same aircraft and crew to supply 
more routes, etc.) substituting capital and labour by fuel. I also find that these 
figures are consistent with constant returns to scale, although I do not impose this 
restriction in the estimation. In fact, the average returns to scale for the sample is 
0.98 which coincides with previous empirical evidence on airlines.14 
3.3. Efficiency scores. 
Table 4 presents the average efficiency scores for the three groups of airlines 
defined above, i.e., flag carriers from countries that introduced liberal bilateral 
agreements, flag carriers from other European countries and American carriers. To 
study the evolution of efficiency, when estimating Eqs. (7), (8), (10), I regard each 
airline as two different firms, one for each half of the sample period. Note that an 
efficient company has a score of one, with decreasing scores implying lower levels 
of efficiency. The table includes two measures of technical efficiency for each firm 
and period, based on regressions (1) and (2), respectively. As mentioned above, in 
regression (2) it is impossible to distinguish the inefficiency component from the 
intercept. Most authors impose a normalization setting the efficiency score of the 
most efficient firms equal to one. In this case, I set it equal to 0.83, the measure 
provided by regression (1 ). This makes the two sets of figures easily comparable. 
We find that differences between the two sets of figures are very small and they 
both provide the same ranking for the six subsamples of firms. 
The situation during the first half of the eighties when the European govern-
ments decided the type of policy they wanted to implement in the next years was 
the following. In average terms, the Control-Europe group is the most inefficient 
while there were no differences between the other two sets of companies. It is 
rather unexpected to observe that there are no relevant differences between 
American and some European carriers, since previous papers (see, for instance, 
14 See Caves et al. (1984) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
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Table 4 
Efficiency scores 1 
Alloc. (K, E)2 Alloc. (L, E) 
1980-84 1985-89 1980-84 1985-89 
LBA Flag Carriers 3 
Control-Europe 
Control-USA 
0.62 
0.71 
0.63 
Technical (1) 
0.57 
0.43 
0.60 
0.94 0.91 
0.80 0.80 
0.91 0.92 
Technical (2) 
1980-84 1985-89 1980-84 1985-89 
LBA Flag Carriers 
Control-Europe 
Control-USA 
LBA Flag Carriers 
Control-Europe 
Control-USA 
Notes: 
0.76 
0.64 
0.77 
Average 4 
1980-84 
0.77 
0.72 
0.77 
0.66 0.70 0.66 
0.69 0.66 0.68 
0.83 0.78 0.83 
1985-89 
0.71 
0.64 
0.78 
1 An efficient firm has a score of 1, with decreasing scores implying lower levels of efficiency. 
2 Allocative inefficiency from absolute values. 
3 For a definition of the firms included in each group, see Section 3.1. 
4 Average values have been calculated using technical inefficiency according to regression (1 ). 
Encaoua, 1991) have suggested higher efficiency scores for the American carriers 
-an explanation for this result is given below. Differences become more relevant 
when looking at specific types of inefficiency. American carriers and LBA flag 
carriers are better at combining labour with fuel inputs while the other European 
flag carriers are better at combining capital with fuel. Low capital-fuel efficiency 
scores are expected for firms facing long-term dynamic investment programs. This 
can be the case for American airlines, competing in a liberalized domestic market 
since 1978, and also of some LBA flag carriers, given that at the beginning of the 
eighties their governments introduced liberal agreements with the U.S. affecting 
the main North-Atlantic routes. Additionally, the attitude of some governments 
such as the British and the Dutch governments, which were very committed to the 
liberalization of their markets, could have given incentives to their flag carriers to 
start long term dynamic investment processes to renew their fleet. Differences in 
technical efficiency are also significant, with American carriers ahead in the 
efficiency ranking followed by LBA and other European flag carriers. It is clear 
that during the first half of the eighties the companies in the LBA group were more 
efficient than the Control-Europe carriers. However, it is difficult to assess if these 
differences warrant the different views of European governments on deregulation. 
Table 4 also provides information about the evolution of these three sets of 
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firms during the eighties. With respect to allocative efficiency the results are the 
following. The changes in the Control-Europe group are very small. We only 
observe a relevant fall in capital-fuel allocative efficiency. As before a likely 
explanation for this change is the introduction by these companies of dynamic 
investment programs as a response to the first deregulatory measures introduced by 
the European Council in 1987 and the announcement of further liberalization at the 
beginning of the nineties. However, given the limited scope of these measures, 
firms did not find incentives to reorganise their labour demand. On the other hand, 
the situation of the US carriers is very stable. The deregulation of the U.S. 
domestic market had taken place as early as 1978 and during the period 1980-84 
we observe its short run effects. Thus, during the second half of the eighties we 
find quite stable allocative efficiency scores. Finally, we find that allocative 
efficiency scores fall for the LBA group. It is likely that this general negative 
effect is a short run effect provoked by the introduction of the liberal agreements. 
The introduction of competition and the possibility of partially restructuring the 
companies' network implies important adjustments in capital and labour input 
demands that cannot be made in a short period. This would explain the reduction 
in allocative efficiency. 
Fig. 1 provides further information about the evolution of technical efficiency. 
This figure has been constructed using the group average error term, E. Assuming 
that for a given year the component v is the same for all the firms, i.e., it is an 
exogenous international demand shock, it is possible to compare the evolution of 
efficiency among the three groups by dividing the group average error terms by the 
Technical Efficiency 
1.15 ~-------------------------~ 
1.1 
1.05 
0.95 
--
0.9 .............................. ~ ... '!".".' ... 
'' ............................ .,.. """"\'."" 
--- ---
' ' ' ' ' 
0.85 '------'-------'-----'------J..----"------' 
1,978 1,980 1,982 1,984 
Year 
1,986 
LBA-i"lag Control-Europe Control-USA 
Group average error terms in deviations to the sample average in the same year. 
Fig. 1. Evolution of technical efficiency. 
1,988 1,990 
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average for the whole sample in the same year. Both Fig. 1 and Table 4 suggest 
the following evolution for the American carriers. During the first half of the 
eighties, we observe efficiency scores below the American sample average, 
followed by efficiency improvements during the second half of the eighties. We 
could interpret the low efficiency scores in 1980-84 as a short run effect from the 
US domestic deregulation introduced in 1978. This would explain why we do not 
observe differences between American and LBA carriers during the first half of the 
eighties. Accordingly, the set of LBA carriers start reducing their efficiency after 
the introduction of the first liberal agreements with the US around 1982 and face 
even stronger reductions in efficiency after the introduction of the European liberal 
bilateral agreements around 1984. Finally, flag carriers from other European 
countries follow a quite stable path throughout the period, with efficiency scores 
below the average in all but one single year-note that a value of one means that 
the group average is equal to the average for the whole sample in the same year. 
As a result of all these changes the difference between American and European 
carriers becomes larger with the American carriers becoming the most efficient, 
followed by LB Flag carriers and other European flag carriers, which is consistent 
with previous studies. 
The most plausible explanation for the results presented in Fig. 1 and Table 4 is 
that the introduction of liberalization has given rise to short run reductions in 
efficiency that are expected to be followed by long run efficiency improvements. It 
is possible to think to two complementary reasons for this short run effect. First, 
airlines face more competition in the market as a result of new legislation, and 
need to adjust their inputs. Given that some inputs, such as capital and labour need 
to follow adjustment and learning processes before being fully productive, input 
requirements can increase without leading to an output expansion in the short run 
and, in tum, efficiency falls. Second, under more liberal legislation, airlines have 
the opportunity of reorganizing their output, reducing their service in, or exiting 
from, some routes. This reduction in output cannot always be followed by an 
instantaneous reduction in input requirements. In fact, this is the case for labour, 
owing to the power of professional associations, and capital, due to imperfections 
in the second-hand market for aircraft. The strong opposition that most European 
airlines face when they try to reduce their labour force is a clear example of this 
problem. These results suggest that when the third package of measures was 
introduced by the European Council in 1993, there were large differences in 
efficiency among the European flag carriers, partly due to the different deregulat-
ory policies followed by their governments during the eighties. On the one hand, 
flag carriers from countries that introduced liberal bilateral agreements during the 
eighties were more efficient and had been going through an adjustment process 
during the second half of the eighties to adapt their crew and fleet to new 
competition. These companies are expected to experience efficiency improvements 
during the nineties. On the other hand, flag carriers from other European countries 
were less efficient, mainly for allocative reasons. After the deregulatory measures 
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introduced by the European Council in 1993, these companies still had to 
implement important adjustment plans that would further reduce their efficiency in 
the short run. In any case these results should be interpreted cautiously since 
alternative explanations might prevail. 
3.4. Determinants of productivity: network characteristics and efficiency 
differences. 
Efficiency is not the only determinant of productivity. As Tables 1 and 2 show, 
exogenous network characteristics also play an important role in determining 
firms' productivity. To compare the effect of network characteristics and efficiency 
differences on total factor productivity I measure the difference in output among 
the three sets of firms in both periods, 1980-84 and 1985-89. To obtain these 
results I use the fitted production function, based on the structural form parameters 
derived from Table 1 and regression (2) in Table 2. Table 5 presents the total 
difference in output between any two sets of firms in the sample. Differences in 
output can be explained by three factors: differences in input requirements, in 
efficiency and in network characteristics. In an industry with efficient firms and 
homogeneous networks, differences in input requirements would explain the total 
difference in output, i.e., firms would differ only in size. 
Table 5 
Determinants of the differences in output explained by the fitted production function 
A. Differences with respect to Control-USA. 
LBA Flag Carriers 
1980-84 1985-89 
Total Difference 58.46% 66.77% 
Determinants (as a percentage of the total difference): 
Network characteristics: 
ASL 0.59% 
AC 1.91% 
Efficiency differences 7.47% 
Input differences 90.03% 
B. Differences with respect to LBA Flag Carriers 
Control-Europe 
-0.11% 
0.17% 
12.87% 
87.07% 
1980-84 1985-89 
Total Difference 14.62% 18.31 % 
Determinants (as a percentage of the total difference): 
Network characteristics: 
ASL 14.08% 12.31% 
AC -20.01% -8.65% 
Efficiency differences 36.13% -13.16% 
Input differences 69.80% 109.50% 
Control-Europe 
1980-84 1985-89 
64.53% 72.85% 
1.96% 0.81% 
-0.54% -0.38% 
9.53% 8.25% 
89.05% 91.32% 
Note: These figures are derived from the estimates presented in Table 1 and regression (2) in Table 2. 
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The top panel in Table 5 shows differences between European and American 
carriers. The results are the following. On average during the eighties, European 
airlines are smaller than American carriers and the difference in size increases over 
the period. The difference in input requirements do not fully explain the difference 
in output showing that European airlines are less productive than American 
carriers. On average, technical efficiency explains less than the 10% of this 
difference. As we have seen before, the technical efficiency of LBA flag carriers 
has fallen drastically during the period in relation to the American carriers. Other 
European firms remain quite stable. ASL explains a very small share of the 
difference in output between LBA and American carriers and its effect reduces 
over the sample period. On the other hand, ASL explains almost 2% of the 
difference in output between other European and American carriers during the first 
half of the eighties but less than 1 % during the second half of the decade. Finally, 
AC explains almost 2% for LBA flag carriers in 1980-84, but only 0.2% in 
1985-89. Other European firms have a very small advantage over American 
carriers in terms of AC, which has also been falling during the sample period. In 
general, these figures suggest that, during the eighties, airlines are converging in 
their average network characteristics, but differences in technical efficiency persist. 
The bottom panel in Table 5 shows differences between LBA flag carriers and 
other European flag carriers. The figures show that LBA flag carriers are larger 
than Control-Europe airlines and the difference in size has been increasing during 
the sample period. In 1980-84, the difference in input requirements does not 
justify the difference in output. This means that during this period Control-Europe 
airlines were less productive than LBA flag carriers which could justify the 
different view of their governments about deregulation. In particular, LBA carriers 
are more efficient than other European flag carriers and enjoy some advantages in 
terms of ASL. However, they also suffer from a large disadvantage in terms of AC. 
In the period 1985-89, differences in network characteristics are smaller, mainly 
in terms of AC, and differences in technical efficiency have experienced an 
important change. Now LBA carriers are less efficient that other European flag 
carriers on average. As mentioned above, this seems to result from the short run 
effects of the introduction of the liberal bilateral agreements. As a result, during 
the period 1985-89, Control-Europe airlines are more productive than LBA flag 
carriers. Nevertheless, according to the previous analysis we expect this situation 
to change at the beginning of the nineties when LBA carriers are expected to start 
improving their technical efficiency and other European carriers are expected to 
start adjusting their input combinations and network structure following the 
introduction of the third package of EC deregulatory measures. 
4. Concluding remarks. 
This paper shows that during the first half of the eighties the flag carriers from 
the countries that signed liberal bilateral agreements were more productive than 
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other European flag carriers, due to their higher efficiency. Therefore, differences 
among flag carriers could have affected the different view of the European 
governments about the timing of the deregulatory process. The results also suggest 
that the introduction of deregulatory measures is followed by short run reductions 
in efficiency and long run efficiency improvements. The choice by some European 
countries of partial deregulation has led to more competition in some of the main 
routes where their flag carriers were operating. This competition was strong 
enough to encourage the airlines to start implementing tough adjustment processes 
to improve their competitive position in the long run. However, it seems that this 
adjustment had the effect of reducing their efficiency in the short run, but it has 
taken place while these firms were still enjoying protection in both their domestic 
markets and many international European routes regulated by restrictive bilateral 
agreements. 
On the contrary, the choice of maintaining more protective policies by other 
European governments has not given the firms enough incentives to start adjusting 
their organizational structure to cope better with the expected liberalization of the 
European market. In the nineties, flag carriers from these European countries find 
themselves in a difficult situation since they are less efficient than some of their 
rivals and still have to follow a long term dynamic adjustment process that is 
going to further reduce their efficiency in the short run. This adjustment will have 
to take place while facing much stronger competition both in the international 
European routes and in their domestic markets. In this sense, the decision of some 
countries of implementing partial deregulation at the beginning of the eighties has 
given an important advantage to their flag carriers, which may prove crucial in 
determining the final market configuration in the European airline industry. 
Additionally, the estimation of a production function for the airline industry has 
shown that network attributes have an important effect on firms' productivity. 
Most of these factors are outside the firms' control and, therefore, cannot be 
regarded as inefficiency. The results also show that network attributes have 
different effects on output-factor elasticities and input combinations and this must 
be taken into account when specifying the production function. 
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